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Introduction1. 
Recent years have seen a vast increase in studies on efficacy of 
nightmare treatments and on affective, sleep and personality corre-
lates of nightmares, but attempts to integrate and understand these 
studies have been rare. One (recent) neuro-cognitive model propo-
ses a function and mechanism of a variety of negative dreaming 
including nightmares (Levin & Nielsen, 2007), on which the current 
model elaborates. Aim is to highlight and describe the cognitive 
processes involved in recurrent nightmares.
What is a nightmare?2. 
Nightmare definitions in research and clinical practice vary accor-
ding to several criteria. For instance, the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev. – DSM-IV-TR; (Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, 2000) defines a nightmare as (1) an ex-
tremely frightening dream (2) that leads to awakening. Nightmares 
can only be diagnosed if (3) they do not occur exclusively during the 
course of another mental disorder and (4) if they lead to significant 
distress or functional impairments. The DSM-IV-TR definition is the 
narrowest definition of nightmares; the International Classification 
of Sleep Disorders (2nd ed. – ICSD-2; (American Academy of Sleep 
Medicine, 2005) definition does not limit the range of negative emo-
tions to fear alone as studies have shown that anger, sadness or 
guilt are also prevalent negative emotions in nightmares (Rose, Per-
lis, & Kaszniak, 1992; Zadra, Pilon, & Donderi, 2006)
 The ‘awakening’ criterion has also been disputed. The assump-
tion is that nightmares leading to awakening are more intense than 
nightmares without awakening (usually referred to as bad dreams; 
(Zadra & Donderi, 2000), but nightmares and bad dreams are both 
associated with distress (Blagrove, Farmer, & Williams, 2004). The 
third criterion of the DSM-IV-TR – not occurring exclusively during 
the course of another disorder – excludes post-traumatic nightma-
res in Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) from a diagnosis, and 
prevents specific attention and treatment in the clinical practice. 
Problematic is that few studies have shown that treatment of PTSD 
leads to a reduction in nightmares (see section 1.3). The fourth cri-
terion on distress is not part of the ICSD-2 definition, although not 
nightmare frequency but the separate construct of nightmare dist-
ress seems crucial in determining whether nightmares are a prob-
lem or not (Belicki, 1992). 
Levin & Nielsen (2007) suggested a dimensional scale for dre-
aming, ranging from dysphoric dreams to post-traumatic night-
mares. Negative emotions occur in normal dreams (only 20-25% 
of explicitly stated emotions are positive, yet this figure becomes 
around half when self-rated moods are included; (Hall & Van de 
Castle, 1966; Kramer, Winget, & Whitman, 1971; Schredl & Doll, 
1998; Strauch & Meier, 1989) and increasing in emotional intensity 
are bad dreams (nightmares that do not lead to awakening), night-
mares and finally, post-traumatic nightmares, which are assumed 
to be the most intense. In the research literature, consensus seems 
to be developing to the following definition: all negative emotions 
can occur in nightmares, nightmares lead to awakening and bad 
dreams do not and nightmare distress is an independent but crucial 
construct. Although there is little evidence in favour of excluding 
post-traumatic nightmares from a clinical diagnosis (3rd DSM-IV-
TR criterion), studies have yet to focus on that topic. 
A cognitive model of recurrent nightmares2.1 
In their recent review, Levin & Nielsen proposed a neuro-cognitive 
mechanism and function for of all types of nightmares and bad 
dreams. They argue that by its continuous presentation of novel 
and unexpected elements, dreaming provides an ‘ever-changing 
sequence of contexts to supply the formation of [fear] extinction 
memories’. Bad dreams are thought to be examples of accomplis-
hed fear extinctions, in which a fear memory is neutralised, while 
nightmares are thought to be examples of failed fear extinctions 
– i.e. where the process is disrupted by awakening or too intense 
emotional distress. 
The aim of this model is to elaborate on this well-supported 
model and to describe how nightmares become repetitive and fre-
quent as nightmares associated with clinical distress are typically 
recurrent, whether as a more or less exact replication of a trauma-
tic event (post-traumatic) or as a broader theme like being chased 
(idiopathic). The proposed model is a description of the cognitive 
processes involved in nightmare persistence and associated dist-
ress, with specific considerations for current nightmare treatments 
and predictions about new nightmare treatments.
Besides the work of Levin and Nielsen (2007), the current mo-
del draws heavily from, and owes much to other cognitive models 
about affective disorders (Beck, 1976; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Eh-
lers & Steil, 1995; Rachman, 1980), sleep disorders (Harvey, 2002), 
dream formation (Domhoff, 2001; Hartmann, 1996a; Seligman & 
Yellen, 1987), in particular regarding the role of expectations (La-
Berge & Rheingold, 1990), and scripts (Haberlandt, 1997).
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Nightmares: prevalence and problem2.2 
Although most prevalence studies have focused exclusively on col-
lege students, studies of the general population have indicated that 
nightmares are highly prevalent, with up to 70% suffering from oc-
casional nightmares (Hublin, Kaprio, Partinen, & Koskenvuo, 1999) 
and around 3–5% of the adult population suffering from frequent 
nightmares (Hublin et al., 1999; Klink & Quan, 1987; Spoormaker & 
van den Bout, 2005; Stepansky et al., 1998). A similar percentage 
is estimated to “have a current problem with nightmares” (Nielsen 
& Zadra, 2000). 
Nightmares disturb the sleep (Kales et al., 1980; Krakow, Tand-
berg, & Scriggins, 1995), produce daily distress (Berquier & Ashton, 
1992; Zadra & Donderi, 2000), and may induce physical complaints 
(Köthe & Pietrowsky, 2001). Chronic insomnia and sleep-disorde-
red breathing (sleep apnoea) are also related to nightmares (Klink & 
Quan, 1987; Krakow, Melendrez et al., 2001). Nightmares are one 
of the main symptoms of PTSD (American Psychiatric Associati-
on, 2000; Kilpatrick et al., 1998; Schreuder, van Egmond, Kleijn, & 
Visser, 1998; van der Kolk, Blitz, Burr, Sherry, & Hartmann, 1984) 
and strongly related to general psychopathology and neuroticism 
(e.g., (Blagrove et al., 2004; Zadra & Donderi, 2000). The question is 
whether nightmares are part of an underlying disorder or a separate 
disorder warranting specific attention.
Anxiety symptom or separate disorder?2.3 
Krakow, Hollifield and Schrader (2000) noted that it is still a prevai-
ling view among health professionals that nightmares are secon-
dary to some other mental disorder (e.g. PTSD or another affective 
disorder). For instance, according to the DSM-IV-TR nightmares 
can only be diagnosed when they “do not occur exclusively during 
the course of another mental disorder” (American Psychiatric As-
sociation, 2000). In this view, nightmares are a symptom of a larger 
syndrome: a nightly symptom of anxiety that does not require sepa-
rate attention. After all, when the accompanying disorder has been 
treated, nightmares are thought to disappear (Kaplan & Sadock, 
1998). However, recent publications have shown otherwise. 
For instance, idiopathic nightmares are not part of an underly-
ing anxiety or other mental disorder, as relationships with affective 
complaints have typically been weak or absent (these nightmares 
are more related to general psychopathology level or the personali-
ty factor neuroticism, for a review see (Spoormaker, Schredl, & van 
den Bout, 2006).
Even when nightmares occur during the course of for instance 
PTSD, they are one of the most frequent symptoms (60-80%) in 
PTSD patients (Kilpatrick et al., 1998; Neylan et al., 1998; Spoorma-
ker & Montgomery, 2008). Several lines of evidence are incompa-
tible with the view that nightmares are a secondary symptom. First, 
evidence suggests that nightmares or related REM disruptions 
(fragmentations) function as a risk-factor for the development of 
PTSD (Harvey & Bryant, 1998; Mellman, Bustamante, Fins, Pigeon, 
& Nolan, 2002; Mellman, David, Bustamante, Torres, & Fins, 2001; 
Mellman, David, Kulick-Bell, Hebding, & Nolan, 1995). Second, 
treatment of PTSD does not necessarily lead to a reduction in night-
mare frequency, e.g. in 38 randomised controlled trials on PTSD 
included in a meta-analysis (Bisson et al., 2007) just one showed 
a reduction in nightmares, while five others found no or minimal 
changes on ‘sleep disturbances’ and 32 did not bother to measure 
or report this cardinal feature (Spoormaker & Montgomery, 2008). 
Third, treatment specifically focused on post-traumatic nightmares, 
whether cognitive-behavioural or pharmacological, leads to impres-
sive reductions in general PTSD-symptom-severity (Krakow, Holli-
field et al., 2001; Raskind et al., 2007). So there is strong evidence 
to suggest that even post-traumatic nightmares are more than a 
secondary symptom of PTSD; they are either a core feature of the 
disorder or a disruption that may develop into a separate disorder 
during the course of PTSD. All the more reason to treat nightmares 
as a separate complaint warranting specific treatment – after all, 
untreated nightmares can persist over decades (Schreuder, Kleijn, 
& Rooijmans, 2000). 
Idiopathic and post-traumatic nightmares2.4 
Although idiopathic and post-traumatic nightmares are usually not 
separated in research studies, it is a common notion that these are 
different types of nightmares, with post-traumatic nightmares as 
the most emotionally intense. Two differences between both are 
obvious: 1) post-traumatic nightmares are often exact replications 
of a the traumatic event (Schreuder et al., 1998) and idiopathic 
nightmares are, if repetitive, more related to a broader theme; 2) 
idiopathic nightmares usually occur during REM sleep in the third 
part of the night and post-traumatic nightmares occur earlier in the 
night or during REM or light non-REM sleep (Hartmann, 1996b). A 
recent review (Wittmann, Schredl, & Kramer, 2007) showed that, in 
a re-analysis of Woodward et al.’s polysomnographic data on post-
traumatic nightmares (Woodward, Arsenault, Murray, & Bliwise, 
2000) around 40% of post-traumatic nightmares occurred outside 
REM sleep.
However, differences between post-traumatic and idiopathic 
nightmares should not be overemphasised, as there seem to be 
more similarities than differences. Both consist of visual (dream) hal-
lucinations, both have a repetitive storyline, comparable accompa-
nying emotions and sleep correlates (Germain & Nielsen, 2003), and 
both show the same response to cognitive-behavioural treatment 
(Krakow, Kellner, Pathak, & Lambert, 1995; Krakow, Melendrez et 
al., 2001). Moreover, it is worth noting that although post-traumatic 
nightmares can be replications of (parts of) the original traumatic 
event, post-traumatic nightmares are often not exact replications. 
In one study, 79% of post-traumatic nightmares of Vietnam vete-
rans had distortions (Esposito, Benitez, Barza, & Mellman, 1999). 
Moreover, three studies found that up to half of the nightmares in 
PTSD-patients are idiopathic (Esposito et al., 1999; Mellman et al., 
2001; Schreuder et al., 2000). Most relevant for the current model 
is that both types of nightmares are recurrent nightmares (whether 
exact replications or more skeleton-like structures) that persist over 
years. 
An overview of the model3. 
The repetitive storyline of recurrent nightmares is based upon 
a real-life traumatic event (post-traumatic nightmares) or upon a 
broader theme such as being chased or losing a relative (idiopathic 
nightmares). The current model proposes that information about 
the storyline of a recurrent nightmare is represented in the memory 
as a fixed expectation pattern: a script. 
This script describes a typical sequence of events and allows 
for variability. For instance, a person with recurrent nightmares in 
which he/she is chased may be chased by different attackers in 
different settings. As most dream memories, the script is poorly 
integrated into the autobiographical memory. Dream memories do 
not have a context in time, place, subsequent, and other previous 
information necessary for integration into the autobiographical me-
mory. The nightmare script is not only an isolated but also a highly 
distressing memory that, unlike other dream memories, is clearly 
recalled after its occurrence and during the day. 
If neutral or ambiguous dream elements are interpreted as thre-
atening and similar to elements of a recurrent nightmare script, the 
nightmare script is activated and due to the highly visual mode of 
the brain in REM sleep (Hobson, Stickgold, & Pace-Schot, 1998), 
the nightmare is replayed (see Fig. 1). This replay strengthens the 
nightmare script, a process mediated by the emotional intensity of 
the nightmare. Perceived similarity between dream elements and 
the nightmare script is mediated by the interpretive bias and acces-
sibility of the script. Normalisation and integration of the script is 
prevented through several cognitive and behavioural processes, in 
particular cognitive avoidance.
The nightmare script4. 
Frequent nightmares typically have a repetitive storyline. In a recent 
study of 188 college students with nightmares we found that, of all 
nightmares, including non-frequent, occasional nightmares, about 
60% have a repetitive storyline (Lancee & Spoormaker, unpublished 
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data) and 91% of the participants with more than one nightmare a 
week reported that their nightmares had a repetitive storyline. In 
a sample of schoolchildren, 44% of most recent nightmares were 
reported to be repetitive (Schredl & Pallmer, 1998).
The current model suggests that the repetitive storyline of night-
mares is represented in the memory as a script, similar to a mental 
groove for verbal behaviour or a schema for procedural knowledge. 
A nightmare script is a typical sequence of dreamed events or ima-
ges, where one image is automatically followed by the next (for an 
example, see Table 1). The nightmare script is strongly connected 
with and evokes highly adverse emotions when activated, most 
commonly intense fear. 
Mediating variable: nightmare distress4.1 
The distress caused by nightmares determines whether nightma-
res become recurrent (and problematic). The same dream about 
being chased can lead to feelings of excitement in some persons 
(e.g., thrill-seekers) while it can be frightening for other persons 
and horrifying for anxious persons. This distress is proposed to be 
exacerbated by the personality factor neuroticism - the tendency 
to experience negative emotions - and related constructs like trait 
anxiety / thrill seeking. After all, neuroticism and/or general psy-
chopathology is strongly related to nightmares distress, i.e. distress 
caused by nightmares, which seems more a personality trait than a 
characteristic of the nightmare. 
The tendency to experience negative emotions affects the inten-
sity and emotional distress of the nightmare. An anxious person is 
likely to get aroused by a chase, leading to intense negative emo-
tions and awakenings, while a thrill-seeker may not get aroused 
to the same extent and may just dream on. Awakening from a 
nightmare prevents normalisation (or fear extinction – Levin & Niel-
sen, 2007) and instead, strengthens connections between intense 
emotions and expectations about the storyline, creating the (highly 
emotional) nightmare script.
Moreover, the tendency to experience negative emotions will 
also lead to negative appraisals of the nightmare event itself, ex-
acerbating nightmare distress. Nightmare distress will be higher 
when appraisals of the nightmare are negative:
“Something is seriously wrong with me”;  ▪
“I must be going crazy”;  ▪
“Something bad is going to happen”;  ▪
“I am still having the same problems as in the past”; or  ▪
“Will I never grow out of it!?” ▪
In short, the current model suggests that neuroticism affects both 
the emotional intensity of the nightmare and its evaluation after-
wards. This is not to be confused with the hypothesis (Belicki, 1992) 
that persons with high neuroticism overestimate nightmare intensity 
and distress in retrospect; one study showed that the retrospective 
intensity of one self-selected nightmare was unrelated to neuroti-
cism scores (Schredl, Landgraf, & Zeiler, 2003). Instead, this model 
Figure 1. A cognitive model of recurrent nightmares. If there is perceived similarity between elements of a normal dream and the nightmare 
script, the nightmare script is activated and the nightmare replayed. This strengthens the nightmare script if nightmare distress is high (me-
diated by the personality factor neuroticism) through cognitive and behavioural processes. Both accessibility of the script and interpretive 
bias for ambiguous dream elements are mediated by state anxiety.
Title nightmare script: BEING CHASED
Scene 1: meeting the attacker
Walking in the dark 
Seeing an unfamiliar person 
Scene 2: chase starts
Unfamiliar person starts moving towards dreamer
Dreamer starts walking and eventually runs away
The unfamiliar person follows
Scene 3: climax
The attacker gets nearer 
Dreamer unable to run fast; slows down
The attacker catches up
--> Intense fear; awakening
Table 1. Example of a typical sequence of events in a common re-
current nightmare.
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strongly interconnected images, the first image of the nightmare will 
result in the next (and so on), and the nightmare elaborates accor-
ding to the typical sequence of nightmare events.
The nightmare script is thought to become activated when ele-
ments in a neutral dream resemble elements of the script. When 
a person has, for instance, nightmares about being chased by an 
attacker in the dark, a running person in a dream can be interpreted 
as a ‘threatening’ element, in this case: a possible attacker. The 
running person in the dream is intrinsically neutral, but if there is 
perceived similarity to the script, this image activates the script and 
the nightmare starts. Dark alleys or unfamiliar or running persons 
are other intrinsically neutral but ‘hazardous’ dream stimuli that may 
activate the ‘being chased’ nightmare script (see Table 2). 
Vague physical similarity would be sufficient in perceiving dream 
elements as similar to those of the script (comparable to poor sti-
mulus discrimination in PTSD – Ehlers & Clark, 2000). The night-
mare can therefore be activated even if the dream elements are 
rather different from the original nightmare. This is why recurrent 
idiopathic nightmares employ varying persons and context – these 
depend on the neutral dream elements that preceded and activated 
the script. In a similar vein, the common distortions in post-trauma-
tic nightmares can be explained.
The model proposes that two cognitive processes mediate per-
ceived similarity between dream elements and script: 1) the inter-
pretive bias and 2) the accessibility of the script. These two proces-
ses are both affected by current levels of anxiety.
Interpretive bias 4.3.1 
The interpretive bias denotes the evaluation of a particular stimulus: 
is it threatening or not? It has repeatedly been found that anxious 
individuals are more likely than non-anxious individuals to interpret 
ambiguous stimuli as threatening. An experimental lexical decision 
task with homographs (words with both threat-related and neut-
ral meanings, e.g. ‘batter’) showed that high trait-anxious persons 
were more prone to interpret these words as threatening (Richards 
& French, 1992). Similar results were found in a lexical decision task 
with ambiguous sentences in persons with test anxiety (Calvo, Ey-
senck, & Estevez, 1994) and with sentence pairs (with the first one 
being ambiguous) in high and low trait-anxious persons (MacLeod 
& Cohen, 1993). This interpretive bias is thought to reflect an anxi-
ous mood state (Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991) 
and has been reported in generalised anxiety disorder (Hazlett-
Stevens & Borkovec, 2004) and social anxiety (Constans, Penn, & 
Hope, 1999).
According to the current model, this interpretive bias is also pre-
sent in during REM sleep. Hazardous dream elements are similar 
to homographs in lexical decision tasks in the sense that they are 
ambiguous: they can be interpreted as threatening or as neutral. 
This interpretation of an ambiguous dream element determines the 
further course of the dream – whether it will activate a nightmare (in-
terpretation: threatening) or continue as a normal dream (interpreta-
tion: neutral). It is predicted that persons with recurrent nightmares 
have a negative interpretive bias for hazardous dream elements: 
hazardous dream elements should lead to shorter reaction times 
for the subsequent recognition of threatening words than neutral 
dream elements.
proposes that the reaction to threatening elements in the nightmare 
is more emotionally intense in persons with high neuroticism; just 
as they respond more emotionally intense to daily events than for 
instance thrill-seekers. Additionally, negative appraisals about the 
nightmare are more likely to occur in persons with high neuroticism. 
In turn, nightmare intensity and negative evaluations - which can 
both be categorised under the concept of nightmare distress - de-
termine whether nightmares become recurrent and problematic. 
Cognitive avoidance4.2 
Cognitive avoidance is proposed to be the mechanism by which an 
occasional nightmare with high nightmare distress could become 
recurrent. When a nightmare has a highly negative impact and is 
appraised in a negative manner, cognitive avoidance starts directly 
after awakening. The person tries not to think about the nightmare 
because it evokes too much fear and/or because he/she may be-
lieve that thinking about the nightmare will increase the chance of 
experiencing it again. 
Cognitive avoidance persists throughout the day (e.g. “It was 
only a dream” – (Schredl & Pallmer, 1998) and has several conse-
quences. First, it makes memory integration of the nightmare script 
into the (autobiographical) memory less probable. Due to cognitive 
avoidance, the script is more likely to become an isolated and in-
dependent memory. 
Second, it prevents emotional normalisation of the script (e.g., 
fear extinction) – both the type of emotion and its intensity will re-
main unaltered. Every time the nightmare occurs (see 3.3) the ima-
ges are accompanied by the same negative and intense emotions. 
In this way, cognitive avoidance maintains the strong association 
between the script and its accompanying emotions. 
Third, cognitive avoidance also prevents brainstorming about 
alternate responses to the threatening situation in the nightmare. 
This reduces the chance that the script will alter spontaneously. 
Each time the nightmare occurs, associations between the dream 
images and events are strengthened – and the typical sequence 
gets fixed. Both emotions and dream images/event become robust 
to change (strong fear memory).
In addition, cognitive avoidance leads to several behavioural res-
ponses that disrupt sleep. Examples are: getting out of bed, making 
something to eat or drink, delaying bedtimes, sleeping with lights 
on and several other safety behaviours practised to cope with the 
fear of going to sleep that is common in nightmare sufferers (Hay-
nes & Mooney, 1975; Krakow, Hollifield, & Schrader, 2000; Spoor-
maker, Schredl et al., 2006), which is why nightmares may have an 
etiological role in the development of insomnia, especially in PTSD 
patients.
Activation of the script4.3 
Activation of the nightmare script results in a replay of the nightma-
re. During REM sleep, the visual system of the brain is highly active: 
it continuously produces hallucinations by projecting memories 
and novel elements before the eyes. Our brain can be viewed as 
a hyperactive visual ‘dream machine’ during REM sleep (Hobson, 
1999). As a result, activation of the script during REM sleep will lead 
to a sequence of visual hallucinations. As a script is a sequence of 
Script Dream elements
Being chased Running persons, strangers, dark surroundings.
Losing a relative Being with relative, unfamiliar surroundings. 
Drowning Swimming, water: rivers, lakes, or seas. 
Falling High grounds: cliffs, mountains, or skyscrapers.
Re-experiencing a car crash Driving a car, highway, traffic.
Re-experiencing a war trauma Colleagues, noises, surroundings resembling war-territory (e.g., jungle, desert).
Table 2. Examples of dream elements that may start a particvular script.
A cognitive model of recurrent nightmares
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 Another prediction is that the interpretive bias in nightmares re-
flects an anxious mood state. With high levels of state anxiety, ha-
zardous dream elements are more easily interpreted as threatening. 
A high state anxiety alters the interpretive bias in such a way that a 
larger number of hazardous dream elements can be interpreted as 
threatening; the pool of hazardous dream elements increases. For 
instance, with a nightmare script about being chased, instead of 
running dream personages, all moving dream objects may be inter-
preted as threats when state anxiety is high. In contrast, when state 
anxiety is low(er), the pool of hazardous dream elements decreases 
and instead of all running dream-personages, only male dream-
personages running towards the dreamer may be interpreted as 
threats and activate the script. In accordance with this prediction is 
the repeatedly found result that state anxiety is strongly related to 
nightmare frequency (De Koninck & Brunette, 1991; Köthe & Piet-
rowsky, 2001; Schredl, 2003).
Accessibility of the script4.3.2 
The accessibility of the script concerns the ease with which the 
script is activated: the threshold for activation. With a high acces-
sibility (and low threshold) the script is easily triggered, and with a 
low accessibility (and high threshold) the script is more difficult to 
activate. Accessibility mediates the likelihood that a certain dream 
element will activate the script. For instance, if the activation of the 
nightmare script is compared to the firing of a neuron, then the in-
terpretive bias relates to how many other neurons would send their 
spike, and accessibility to the polarisation of the neuron itself, i.e. 
how easily it reaches the threshold and fires.  
The accessibility of the script is a function of (poor) memory in-
tegration and disrupted fear extinction. Post-traumatic nightmares 
are examples of strong fear memories in which there is little place 
for novel elements and fear extinction. Strong fear memories are 
highly accessible and in its most extreme case, the script is so 
highly accessible that it becomes activated by any dream element 
preceding it – a phenomenon that has been reported in PTSD-pati-
ents, for whom post-traumatic nightmares could as start as early as 
the first REM episode (Hartmann, 1996b). 
Cognitive-behavioural treatment of nightmares4.4 
Several cognitive-behavioural techniques are effective in reducing 
nightmare frequency (for a review see Spoormaker, Schredl et al., 
2006) but theoretical developments integrating these findings have 
been lacking. The current model explains the efficacy of these 
treatments with different mechanisms. In addition, it predicts a new 
cognitive-behavioural treatment of nightmares. 
Increasing the threshold for activation: Relaxation4.4.1 
Relaxation reduces nightmare frequency (Burgess, Gill, & Marks, 
1998; Miller & DiPilato, 1983)  by reducing current levels of (state) 
anxiety, which are positively related to nightmare frequency. The 
present cognitive model suggests that through relaxation and the 
reduction of state anxiety both the interpretive bias and the ac-
cessibility of the script will alter – the pool of ‘hazardous’ dream 
elements activating the nightmare script diminishes, whereas the 
threshold for activation of the script becomes higher. As a result, 
dream elements will less frequently be perceived as similar to the 
nightmare script, and activation is therefore less likely.
Overcoming cognitive avoidance: Exposure4.4.2 
Exposure (systematic desensitisation) is an effective treatment for 
nightmares (Burgess et al., 1998; Burgess, Marks, & Gill, 1994; Cel-
luci & Lawrence, 1979) that is usually accompanied by relaxation, 
but has shown better outcomes in nightmare reduction than relaxa-
tion alone (Burgess et al., 1998). One study found that the effects of 
exposure were maintained over four years (Grandi, Fabbri, Panatto-
ni, Gonnella, & Marks, 2006). With exposure, participants are inst-
ructed to write down a nightmare and to re-experience it using their 
imagination. Exposure breaks through cognitive avoidance, which 
is, according to the proposed model, a main mechanism respon-
sible for the persistence of a script. By breaking through cognitive 
avoidance, exposure makes integration and consolidation of the 
script into the (autobiographical) memory more likely, and emotio-
nal normalisation of the script is more likely to occur. 
Changing the script: Cognitive-restructuring 4.4.3 
Cognitive-restructuring techniques restructure the script. The intro-
duction of novel, nightmare-incompatible elements into the night-
mare may serve the proposed function of fear extinction (Levin & 
Nielsen, 2007) but certainly breaks down the expectation pattern of 
the script. Two cognitive-restructuring techniques have been evalu-
ated in randomised controlled trials: imagery rehearsal therapy (IRT) 
and lucid dreaming treatment (LDT).
IRT (Marks, 1978) has developed into a technique in which par-
ticipants are instructed to change a recurrent nightmare any way 
they wish, which they then have to rehearse in imagination. IRT 
has shown positive long-term results in randomised trials, with lar-
ge effect sizes (> 1) for nightmare frequency reduction after one to 
three group sessions (Krakow, Hollifield et al., 2001; Krakow et al., 
2000; Krakow, Kellner et al., 1995). In addition, IRT improved the 
(subjective) sleep quality and decreased PTSD symptom severity in 
sexual assault survivors with PTSD (Krakow, Hollifield et al., 2001). 
Two studies with longer follow-ups (18 and 30 months) showed that 
the effects of IRT are maintained over a longer period (Krakow, Kell-
ner, Neidhardt, Pathak, & Lambert, 1993; Krakow, Kellner, & Pathak, 
1994) and IRT is currently the treatment-of-choice for nightmares 
(Spoormaker, Schredl et al., 2006).
LDT is an alternative cognitive-restructuring technique. Lucid 
dreaming refers to a person realising that he/she is dreaming in the 
dream itself. Lucid dreaming has been verified by volitional eye-
movements during REM sleep (LaBerge, Nagel, Demen, & Zarcone, 
1981) and is a learned cognitive skill (Purcell, Mullington, Moffit, 
Hoffman, & Pigeau, 1986; Zadra, Donderi, & Pihl, 1992). Particularly 
because nightmares can spontaneously ‘trigger’ lucidity in night-
mares (Schredl & Erlacher, 2004), lucid dreaming may be an appro-
priate technique for treating nightmares. Only two series of cases 
(Spoormaker, van den Bout, & Meijer, 2003; Zadra & Pihl, 1997) and 
one randomised trial (Spoormaker & van den Bout, 2006) have been 
conducted to evaluate the effects of LDT and these indicate that, in 
one to three sessions, LDT reduces nightmare frequency (without 
affecting anxiety levels or sleep quality as IRT). 
The current model predicts that in a randomised comparison with 
adequate power, cognitive-restructuring techniques show better 
outcomes in nightmare frequency reduction than exposure. 
Restructuring negative appraisals: Paradoxical 4.4.4 
intention
Another hypothesis regarding cognitive-behavioural treatment is 
that since negative appraisals / nightmares distress are proposed 
to be crucial in the creation and persistence of nightmare scripts, 
alleviating negative appraisals would lead to a reduction in night-
mares. This means that paradoxical intention, similar as employed 
in insomnia (Morin et al., 1999), would show positive treatment out-
comes. In other words, encouraging nightmare sufferers to ‘have 
nightmares’ would reduce the chances that they actually have one. 
When negative appraisals are replaced by more positive appraisals 
(i.e., it is good or functional to have nightmares), nightmare dist-
ress will be lowered and script formation halted. In line with this 
novel technique derived from the model is the finding that people 
have significantly fewer nightmares in the sleep laboratory or even 
when measured with polysomnography (Spoormaker, Schreuder, 
de Weerd, Kleijn, & Kamphuisen, 2006). The costly procedure and 
efforts aimed at measuring nightmares, could give people the idea 
that they have to perform, i.e. have a nightmare.
Paradoxical intention could credibly be introduced as part of 
a cognitive-restructuring technique. The aim of IRT or LDT is to 
change the nightmare, and in order to change it, one should have a 
nightmare or rather: as many as possible. Persons could be encou-
raged in more or less subtle ways and a comparative study of IRT 
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with and without paradoxical intention should show better outco-
mes for the former condition.  
Clinical implications5. 
As mentioned before, it is still a common view among health pro-
fessionals that nightmares are secondary to some other mental dis-
order and do not warrant specific treatment. This is problematic 
because idiopathic nightmares have weak relationships with spe-
cific anxiety and depressive complaints and because even when 
nightmares occur during the course of another mental disorder 
such as PTSD, there is little evidence that shows that they recede 
once PTSD has been treated (Spoormaker & Montgomery, 2008). 
However, specific treatment of post-traumatic nightmares does 
lead to both nightmare reduction and PTSD-symptom-severity 
(Krakow, Hollifield et al., 2001). For instance, a re-analysis of 38 
RCTs on PTSD treatment showed that 12-14 sessions of cognitive-
behavioural trauma-focused treatment resulted in minimal changes 
on sleep disturbances while a three-session cognitive-behavioural 
nightmare-focused treatment did reduce both nightmare frequency 
and PTSD-symptom-severity (Spoormaker & Montgomery, 2008). 
It seems therefore more fruitful for mental health professionals to 
adopt a new view on nightmares. This new view should stress that 
no matter how they are induced, nightmares may develop into an 
independent and persistent disorder warranting specific attention. 
The DSM-IV-TR has a separate diagnosis for idiopathic nightmares; 
we suggest professionals use it more often. And although post-
traumatic nightmares cannot receive a specific diagnosis according 
to the DSM-IV-TR, we suggest that professionals more closely mo-
nitor the effects of PTSD treatment on post-traumatic nightmares. 
Cognitive-behavioural treatment that focuses on memory integrati-
on and emotional normalising of the traumatic event (i.e., nightmare 
script) is likely to reduce nightmare frequency, but when there is no 
effect, specific nightmare treatment should be considered.
Limitations6. 
The present model has a few limitations. First, it focuses on a spe-
cific type of nightmares: recurrent nightmares. Other types of ne-
gative dreams, including bad dreams and dysphoric dreaming, fall 
outside the scope of this model. 
Furthermore, it is unsure whether the proposed model is sup-
ported by brain mechanisms during REM sleep. For example, an 
interpretive bias and the activation of a script concern active and 
complex cognitive processes that may well require aminergic acti-
vity. However, neuropharmacological evidence shows that aminer-
gic activity is diminished during REM sleep (Hobson et al., 1998). 
Nightmares may differ from normal REM sleep in this regard, as 
serotonergic and dopaminergic agents have been found most like-
ly to induce nightmares (Pagel & Helfter, 2003; Thompson & Pier-
ce, 1999), whereas a noradrenergic antagonist (Prazosin) has an 
ameliorating effect on nightmare frequency (Raskind et al., 2003; 
Raskind et al., 2007). But to date, the necessary presence of neuro-
pharmacological mechanisms or the necessary brain activation for 
such complex cognitive processes during REM sleep have not yet 
been sufficiently proven.
Conclusions7. 
A conceptual model for the persistence of recurrent nightmares has 
been introduced that addresses the role of cognitive processes in 
recurrent nightmares. The central element of this model concerns 
the representation of the nightmare in a script, a consequence of 
cognitive avoidance due to negative appraisals and nightmare dis-
tress. Activation of this script results in a replay of the nightmare 
through perceived similarity between dream elements and elements 
of the script. This mechanism is suggested to depend on the ac-
cessibility of the script and the interpretive bias, which are in turn 
both affected by current levels of anxiety. The script, based upon 
a real-life traumatic event or a broader theme, is unlikely to be al-
tered, integrated, or normalised without specific cognitive-behavi-
oural treatment. 
Although the present model has its limitations, its testable pre-
dictions and treatment implications should be able to aid and guide 
future studies as well as mental health professionals.
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